Catechism index

1751 I. The Sources of Morality The object chosen is a good toward which the will deliberately directs itself. It is the matter of a human act. the object chosen morally specifies the act of the will, insofar …
1752 I. The Sources of Morality In contrast to the object, the intention resides in the acting subject. Because it lies at the voluntary source of an action and determines it by its end, intention is an element …
1753 I. The Sources of Morality A good intention (for example, that of helping one's neighbor) does not make behavior that is intrinsically disordered, such as lying and calumny, good or just. the end does not justify the …
1754 I. The Sources of Morality The circumstances, including the consequences, are secondary elements of a moral act. They contribute to increasing or diminishing the moral goodness or evil of human acts (for example, the amount of a …
1755 II. Good Acts and Evil Acts A morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if the object is good in itself …
1756 II. Good Acts and Evil Acts It is therefore an error to judge the morality of human acts by considering only the intention that inspires them or the circumstances (environment, social pressure, duress or emergency, etc.) which supply …
1757 IN BRIEF The object, the intention, and the circumstances make up the three "sources" of the morality of human acts.
1758 IN BRIEF The object chosen morally specifies the act of willing accordingly as reason recognizes and judges it good or evil.
1759 IN BRIEF "An evil action cannot be justified by reference to a good intention" (cf St. Thomas Aquinas, Dec. praec. 6). the end does not justify the means.
1760 IN BRIEF A morally good act requires the goodness of its object, of its end, and of its circumstances together.
1761 IN BRIEF There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good …
1762 THE MORALITY OF THE PASSIONS The human person is ordered to beatitude by his deliberate acts: the passions or feelings he experiences can dispose him to it and contribute to it. Previous - Next Copyright © Libreria …
1763 I. Passions The term "passions" belongs to the Christian patrimony. Feelings or passions are emotions or movements of the sensitive appetite that incline us to act or not to act in regard to something …
1764 I. Passions The passions are natural components of the human psyche; they form the passageway and ensure the connection between the life of the senses and the life of the mind. Our Lord called …
1765 I. Passions There are many passions. the most fundamental passion is love, aroused by the attraction of the good. Love causes a desire for the absent good and the hope of obtaining it; this …
1766 I. Passions "To love is to will the good of another." 41 All other affections have their source in this first movement of the human heart toward the good. Only the good can be …
1767 II. Passions and Moral Life In themselves passions are neither good nor evil. They are morally qualified only to the extent that they effectively engage reason and will. Passions are said to be voluntary, "either because they …
1768 II. Passions and Moral Life Strong feelings are not decisive for the morality or the holiness of persons; they are simply the inexhaustible reservoir of images and affections in which the moral life is expressed. Passions are …
1769 II. Passions and Moral Life In the Christian life, the Holy Spirit himself accomplishes his work by mobilizing the whole being, with all its sorrows, fears and sadness, as is visible in the Lord's agony and passion. …
1770 II. Passions and Moral Life Moral perfection consists in man's being moved to the good not by his will alone, but also by his sensitive appetite, as in the words of the psalm: "My heart and flesh …